This paper investigates some welfare e¤ects of forced saving through a mandatory pension scheme. The framework for the analysis is a life-cycle model of a borrowing constrained individual's consumption and portfolio choice in the presence of uncertain labour income and realistically calibrated tax and pension systems.
INTRODUCTION
Life-cycle models have generated a lot of interest as a tool for explaining the accumulation and distribution of wealth as well as portfolio choice over the life-cycle. For agents with uncertain income and liquidity constraints, savings serve several purposes, eg. precautionary, retirement and bequest.
The importance of each of these motives varies over the life-cycle and will consequently a¤ect both the consumption and the allocation between assets. Over the life-cycle, retirement savings will dominate in absolute size and are to a large extent accumulated in mandatory pension schemes. The introduction of such a scheme into a life-cycle model will motivate an optimising agent to respond by adjusting her consumption and portfolio composition over time. Furthermore, the design of the mandatory pension scheme will have important welfare e¤ects. This paper has its origin in the literature that highlights uncertainty and market incompleteness as important factors in explaining individual choice and welfare. The …rst papers on this subject came from the consumption literature on bu¤er-stock saving. The life-cycle / permanent income hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) implies that there should be no correlation between consumption and predictable income change, since agents would borrow against future incomes as a mean to equalise consumption over life. However, data shows a positive correlation between the two (cf. Flavin (1981) ; Hall and Mishkin (1982) ; Zeldes (1989) ). Deaton (1991) , Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) created life-cycle models with uncertain wage income and where human capital could not be used as collateral for borrowing and where saving was invested in a risk-free asset. These models could explain the positive correlation between consumption and predictable income change as a rational response to uninsurable income risk in the presence of borrowing constraints 2 . Cocco et al. (2005) and others have extended these models by allowing the agents to allocate between risk-free and risky assets. In order to analyse the e¤ects of di¤erent retirement savings systems, Campbell, Cocco, Gomes & Maenhout (2001) (henceforth CCGM) augmented the Cocco et al. (2005) model by including a mandatory pension scheme. The authors also showed that a lower pension con-tribution makes younger generations increase their welfare by postponing private savings to a time when their labour incomes are higher.
In this paper we want to analyse some welfare e¤ects of forced saving through mandatory pensions schemes. Our model is set in partial equilibrium, whereas eg. Heaton and Lucas (2004) investigate equilibrium e¤ects of alternative pension systems. We restrict our analysis to the problem of an individual who disregards any societal consequences of her choice. The individual welfare e¤ect from forced saving can originate from (at least) four sources. Firstly, it may increase pension savings above the unrestricted level, especially early in life when savings are driven primarily by precautionary motives. Secondly, wealth in retirement accounts cannot be used to accommodate negative income shocks and will therefore incentivise the individual to make additional savings as a precaution. Thirdly, the risk and return characteristics of the "pension asset" may di¤er from the optimal choice and, …nally, it redistributes income from early to later in life, when di¤erent tax rates may apply. In order to analyse these e¤ects, we have chosen a model similar to the life-cycle model of CCGM.
We model individuals rather than households. Our rationale is that: female labour participation and divorce rates are high, which together with an age di¤erence between male and spouse can obscure the expected earnings pro…le if estimated on family data 3 and consequently the "optimal" behaviour in terms of choices will be erroneous; pension contributions and bene…ts are often based on individual rather than family incomes; taxes are usually progressive and primarily dependent on the individual instead of family incomes.
We have chosen Sweden as a benchmark for the calibration of our model, due to the relative simplicity and transparency of both the tax 4 and pension systems. Since the Swedish pension reform in 1999, pension contributions have been credited to an individual notional account with a return set to aggregate labour income growth. This reform has attracted a lot of interest as a potential blueprint for other countries (cf. Schieber & Shoven (1996); Diamond (2002) ). Furthermore, both tax and pension systems are solely dependent on individual rather than on a mixture of individual and family incomes. Finally, the availability of high quality register based data also alleviates some of the quality problems associated with survey data. While calibrated on Swedish data and rules for taxes and pensions, there are several similarities to systems in other countries, eg. the US Social Security retirement system. In both Sweden and the US, contributions and bene…ts are dependent on gross individual income and most importantly, bene…ts are indexed by average wage growth.
Our model extends the CCGM model by including a realistically calibrated tax and pension system.
The main contribution of this paper is that we can attribute a value to mandatory pension savings and analyse the welfare e¤ects of pension returns linked to stochastic labour income growth. Our …ndings show that young individuals save primarily due to precautionary motives and will therefore attribute little value to savings in retirement accounts. Furthermore, there is a loss of welfare associated with uncertain pension returns indexed by labour income growth. This loss stems primarily from the dependency between labour income and pension returns, rather than from the volatility of pension returns.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3 demonstrates how the model is calibrated. The solution algorithm and results are presented in Section 4. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
THE MODEL

Individual preferences
The individual (rather than the household) maximises the expected utility over a …nite life-cycle, which is divided into pre-and post-retirement. Each individual starts her "optimization life" at the age of 20 or 23 (the latter for those with a university degree) 0 , retires at 65 and dies at a maximum age of 100 T . Individuals have constant relative risk aversion preferences on a single non-durable consumption good.
Individual preferences at time m are de…ned as
where C represent consumption at age ; is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, p is the one year age contingent survival probability, is the discount factor, b is the bequest parameter and D is the bequest amount.
Labour income
The labour income process follows Carroll and Samwick (1997) with the exception that it is based on an individual rather than a household. Individuals were divided into six mutually exclusive groups with respect to sex and education. While in the labour force, the individual experiences idiosyncratic as well as common shocks to gross income. During the pre-retirement period the log labour real income l ik for an individual i belonging to group k is exogenous and given as
where f k is a function of the individual characteristics 6 Z ik as well as an average national labour productivity growth l , ik is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N (0; " k ) and v ik is a random walk
The innovation, u ik ; is divided into a group aggregate k N (0; k ) and an individual uncorrelated
Mandatory savings and retirement bene…ts
The Swedish mandatory pension system is divided into a notionally de…ned contribution part, N DC; and a funded de…ned contribution part, F DC. Contributions are paid by the employer and 5 Throughout this paper, we discriminate between the future time periods, , which belongs to the optimization problem, and the historic time, t, which is used for estimation. 6 i.e. age, martial status, family size, number and age of children.
are set to 18:5% of gross income, 16% is added to the N DC account 7 and 2:5% to the F DC (cf.
RFV (2002)). In our portfolio choice model, each part of the pension system unfortunately requires a separate state variable, adding to the curse of dimensionality, cf. Bellman (1961) . We therefore disregard the smaller F DC part of this system.
Contributions to the national pension plan are capped above an income of 300 KSEK 8 . The return on the national pension plan R l is set to the national labour income growth
where P O is the age speci…c annualised mortality adjusted payout function after retirement, and l is the expected national labour income growth aggregated over all groups with noise,
Due to the cap on contributions to the N DC plan, the employer partly compensates by paying into a negotiated plan with the individual as the bene…ciary. Albeit varying to some degree, the vast majority of assets in such plans are managed similarly and at present as de…ned bene…t plans, with bene…ts depending on the wage at retirement. These company de…ned bene…t plans have a payout of 10%, 65% and 32:5% of incomes in the intervals [0; 320), [320; 850) , and [850; 1270) respectively at retirement. The return of the company plan is insured to pay a de…ned bene…t depending on the wage at retirement and guaranteed for the remaining life with no real appreciation after retirement.
In reality it depends on the wage during the …ve years prior to retirement. However, modelling this rule correctly would have necessitated additional state variables. We therefore approximate this by only including the permanent income changes until retirement, 7 In the US, bene…ts are funded through a Social Security tax of 12.4% of the employee´s income up to an amount of $90,000. 8 In the following, KSEK -thousands of Swedish Kronor will be omitted. The present exchange rate is circa 7 SEK / USD. 9 The National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket) is responsible for the actuarial estimation of liabilities and the appropriate discount rate. In reality, if the assets in terms of estimated future contributions and return from the bu¤er funds do not support the growth of liabilities, then the actual bene…ts paid out will be reduced until the assets match the liabilities and vice versa. In this paper we will assume that this will not happen.
An important di¤erence between the Swedish and the US system is that there is no real appreciation of bene…ts after retirement in the US.
Payout from this plan during retirement will be denoted DBP O i : Its dynamics are given by 
All payouts from the N DC pension plan are forfeited in the event of death and for simplicity, we assume the same for the de…ned bene…t plan.
Taxes
Wage and retirement income L i can be de…ned as
According to the present 10 Swedish tax rules, labour income and pension bene…t are taxed at the same rate, and separate from capital income. To calculate net income L n i ; we …rst deduct a general allowance of 10, then a municipal tax of 30%, a government tax of 20% on all income above 300 and …nally an additional government tax of 5% on income above 450. Net income is bounded below by the social welfare minimum bene…t at 60, which also applies to retirees in the form of a government guaranteed pension.
All the threshold values that create kinks in tax rates and bene…ts 11 are appreciated by the expected 1 0 We use the tax rules for incomes earned in 2003. 1 1 This is the same as in the US since the "bend points" when calculating the primary insurance amount (PIA) are national labour income growth l , except the social welfare minimum bene…t which is constant in real terms.
Assets
There exist one risky and one risk-free asset with after tax real simple returns equal to R s and R f respectively. Excess return is de…ned as
and correlated with the group aggregate innovation in permanent labour income k , which allows for a group speci…c sensitivity to the risky asset, 
Private savings and consumption
Each individual starts her "optimization life"with initial wealth set to z. In pre-retirement years the individual receives a wage, and in subsequent years the individual will receive retirement bene…ts.
The individual has two control variables: the proportion of cash on hand to consume, ; and what proportion of savings, ; to allocate to the risky asset. The cash on hand, or disposable wealth, is therefore,
and
adjusted by average earnings growth.
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Finally, we impose both borrowing and short sales constraints, i.e.,
Optimization
The individuals problem can now be characterised as having four state variables ( , v, X and N DC) and two choice variables ( and ) as well as four stochastic variables ( , u, A and ). The value function of the investor's intertemporal consumption and investment problem can be written as
The solution to this maximisation problem gives us the state dependent policy rules,
Since there is no analytical solution to this constrained optimization problem, we solve the problem numerically using standard methods (cf. Judd (1998) ). The problem is solved by backward recursion from the …nal year -100. A description of the procedure is found in Appendix A.
CALIBRATION OF PARAMETERS
Estimation of labour income process
This section describes the estimation of the labour income process. Appendix B gives a more detailed description of the methodology used.
We estimate the parameters in the labour income process by using LINDA data for the years 1992 to 2002. LINDA covers 3.35% of the Swedish population (more then 300,000 individuals plus their family members) and is described in Edin and Fredriksson (2000) . The de…nition of income includes, in addition to wages, all taxable social bene…ts, primarily compensation for unemployment, sickness and early retirement. Data was divided into six non-intersecting groups, de…ned by educational status 12 and sex. The predictable component of labour income was estimated separately for each group and the regressors include dummy variables for marital status and age as well as the number of children in four separate age intervals. Parameter estimates are presented in Table C .3.
We then estimate a polynomial of degree three on the age dummies and the averages of the characteristics to obtain the deterministic component of labour income exp f k ( ; Z k ) ; cf. Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Hubbard et al. (1995) ). Secondly, within each educational group, men have higher incomes in all stages of the life-cycle than their female counterparts.
The variances of the permanent and transitory components, ; of shocks to labour income as speci…ed in Equation (2) were estimated using the methodology of Carroll and Samwick (1997) . The results are presented in Table C .5 along with the results by Carroll and Samwick (1997) who based their study on household gross income, and Cocco et al. (2005) who used household net income.
Our results show a strikingly lower variation in the transitory component when compared to both of these studies. This was surprising, since we expected a diversi…cation e¤ect within the family and that the lower variation in net vs gross income, would reduce the residual variation.
One possible explanation could be that measurement errors are treated in the same way as transitory income shocks and thereby increase the estimated variance. Comparing register based and survey data, Duncan and Hill (1985) and Bound et al. (1994) demonstrate that survey data, such as the PSID, can give rise to measurement errors, which may have a large e¤ect on estimated variances.
Our lower estimates can therefore partially be explained by the data in LINDA being based on …led tax reports which are more precise. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , p 81, state that: "a reasonable guess might be that roughly a third of the variance of measured income growth is due to mismeasurement and that most of this is transitory".
Individual parameters
We use a standard set of assumptions with respect to the individual parameters for the reference case. First, we set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to 5 and the discount factor to 0.98.
The survival probabilities p are sex dependent and taken from the Swedish life insurers (cf. Figure   C .2) when underwriting new policies, i.e. it is forward looking 14 . The bequest parameter b is set to 1. The importance of the risk aversion parameter will be elaborated on when we do the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.4.
Assets and correlations
In the optimization, we set the risk-free after tax rate R f 1 to 1.5%, which is lower than the 2% in Cocco et al. (2005) , but …ts with the present gross return of less than 2% for long dated index linked bonds. The mean after tax equity premium s is set to 3%, which is low when compared with historical average, but corresponds well with forward-looking estimates (cf. Claus and Thomas (2001) ; Fama and French (2002) , among others). Volatility was set to 20% for the risky asset.
Next, we follow the procedure of Cocco et al. (2005) to estimate the correlation % k between group speci…c permanent labour income shocks k and lagged equity returns 1 . In Table C .1, we present the estimated correlation using the returns of the Swedish equity index OMX and the 12-month Swedish Treasury Bill as proxies for equity returns and the risk-free rates, respectively. Due to the uncertainty in the equity premium, we analyse the sensitivity in Section 4.4 of our results with respect to an increase in this parameter.
It can be noted that university educated women and men de…ne the range for the correlation, with women having the lowest. One possible explanation could be that women with a university degree are to a larger degree publicly employed. We also set the growth in average labour income l to 1.8%, which is the estimate used by the National Social Insurance Board. Finally, the initial wealth z is set to 47, corresponding to the mean wealth for individuals between the ages of 20 and 23.
RESULTS
To study the behaviour of an individual belonging to a speci…c group, we now use the policy functions in Equations (18) At retirement, the permanent component of labour income shock decides the de…ned bene…t for the remainder of the life. For large values of cash on hand, the optimal policy in risky weight coincides with the complete market solution 15 . When the ratio of cash on hand to the implicit pension assets ( X N DC+DB ) decreases, both the consumption and risky share will increase. As the ratio decreases even further, the dominating savings motive is bequest and therefore the risky share is reduced back to the complete market solution. The curvature in policy functions is caused by the de…ned bene…t payout being more sensitive to changes in permanent income (cf. Equation (8)). Since de…ned bene…t resembles a risk-free asset, the agent will compensate by increasing both the risky and consumption share.
[Insert …g C.12 and C.13 here]
To study the potential outcomes of the model, we simulate the behaviour of an individual (one from each group) by generating 30,000 random trajectories through time. These simulated distributions cannot be directely compared with the actual distributions of today, since the latter are conditional on one realisation for several individuals. In addition, the present population lived under very di¤erent conditions in terms of productivity level, pension systems, etc. compared to the present and future that we model.
The top and bottom pictures in Figure C .14 show the simulated individual frequency distribution across age for the risky weight and consumption share, respectively. We note that the short sale constraint is e¤ective for most trajectories in mid-life. Outside this period, there is a wide range of optimal choices dependent on state variables other than age.
[Insert …g C.14here]
Reference case
In this section, we present the cross-section averages from the simulation. In Figures C.3 and C.4
we plot the average of cash on hand, consumption, consumption share, retirement wealth in the N DC account, after tax income and the portfolio allocation for an individual from each group.
We note that the individual tries to smooth consumption over life, which can be seen if we compare the wage and consumption pro…les. However, an increasing and uncertain labour income together with the borrowing constraint create a hump-shaped consumption pro…le, as in eg. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) .
The decline in consumption during retirement is primarily due to mortality risk, which gives rise to a more ‡at consumption pro…le for women than for men. It should also be noted that consumption increases with after tax income and peaks close to retirement.
The peak in wages occurs later than in empirical cross-section data since the wage pro…le is forward looking, i.e. it includes the expected increase in wages from the average productivity growth.
The cap on the contribution amount has the e¤ect that there are only small di¤erences in N DC wealth at retirement (cf. Figure C. 3), even though wages di¤er markedly between groups. However, the company sponsored de…ned bene…t plan compensates high income earners for the cap, making the retention rates almost equal across the groups (cf. Table C.4). This result corresponds well with projections from dynamic micro-simulations (cf. Flood (2003) ).
In order to alleviate the drop in income at retirement, the individual also saves voluntarily to even out consumption over the life-cycle. As can be seen in the consumption share average, retirement saving does not start before mid-life. Prior to this, savings are driven by precautionary and bequest motives. Consequentially, the cash on hand during early life is largely invested in the risk-free asset.
When private savings for retirement increases during mid-life, wealth is allocated to the risky asset, since the implicit assets in mandatory pension schemes and future wages are closer substitutes to the risk-free asset.
[Insert …g C.3 and C.4 here]
As cash on hand becomes relatively larger in comparison to the implicit assets, the investor compensates by reducing the risky weight. Although the implicit assets are less risky, they are not risk-free.
The risk is most pronounced for university-educated men. This group has both a larger relative exposure to the de…ned bene…t asset and a higher correlation between their wages and the stock market.
They will therefore choose a lower risky allocation from mid-life until retirement, when the de…ned bene…t asset becomes risk-free.
[Insert …g C.1 here]
The pro…le for cash on hand has the charateristic life-cycle shape that we …nd in the data 16 (cf. Figure C .1). We also see the e¤ect of the gender di¤erence in longevity on consumption and savings behaviour. During retirement women will decrease their cash on hand at a lower rate than men will, since they expect to distribute their savings for consumption over a longer period.
Valuing the N DC account
Forced saving in early life, when the wage pro…le is increasing, raises the question of the value of the N DC asset. In Equation (20), we express the value of the N DC asset 17 in terms of cash on hand X, by calculating the expected value of the ratio of the respective derivatives of Equation (17),
[Insert …g C.5 here]
We note in Figure C .5 that the marginal value that an individual attributes to the N DC account is low in early life. This result is primarily caused by forced retirement saving at a time in life when consumption is preferred. Moreover, since N DC wealth cannot serve the precautionary motive, the 1 6 The two pro…les are not directely comparable since the simulated pro…le relates to future wealth whereas the actual data is a cross-section from year 2002. In our simulations, there is a peak at age 65 since we assume a …xed retirement date. In reality, there is a lot of variation in retirement age, making the peak less pronounced. After the age of 80 the number of survivors decreases rapidly in our sample and expected wealth is potentially biased upwards, due to survival probabilities being correlated with wealth (cf. Modigliani and Jappelli (1998) ).
1 7 For comparative purposes, since bequest can only come from cash on hand X, we change the model in two ways. First, we allocate the wealth in the N DC account to bequest in case of death, but taxed with the median tax rate of 30%. Second, we remove the inheritance gains in the N DC system. agent will make additional savings as a precaution. As the wealth in the N DC account becomes larger in comparison to private wealth (cf. Figure C. 6), the marginal value of the N DC asset will decrease even further, since the N DC asset primarily ful…ls a small bequest motive. The increase in marginal value until age 40 stems from the retirement savings motive becoming stronger 18 .
The N DC asset has characteristics similar to a combination 19 of the risk-free and risky asset; and the relative value converges to the median after tax value of 70% (cf. Equation (10)). As pension bene…ts are generally lower than wages, only a few trajectories will be in the higher tax brackets during retirement, which is why only the highest income group will experience a slightly smaller value due to higher taxation.
[Insert …g C.6 here]
Risk in the N DC account
This model has …ve "assets": risk-free, risky, de…ned bene…t, future wages and the N DC asset, of which the last three are non-tradeable. In this section we analyse the diversi…cation properties of the N DC asset. As described in Section 3, the N DC return has a volatility of about 2% and is correlated with both group permanent income shocks and the return of the risky asset. Albeit that the volatility is rather low, the risk in the N DC asset has a major impact on individual utility since this is on average the largest asset at retirement.
The economic importance of the risk in the N DC system can be analysed by computing the utility gains associated with two alternative regimes. The …rst regime makes the N DC return riskfree, while the second regime makes the return independent of both group permanent income shocks and the return of the risky asset. In both cases, the expected simple return 20 of the N DC account is held constant and equal to that of the reference case.
The utility gains are presented as consumption and bequest equivalent units CBE. A one percent change in CBE represents the same percentage change in consumption and bequest in all possible 1 8 The ratio has a peak at age 50 for university educated men, as their income is often taxed at a higher rate, whereas the bequest of N DC wealth is only taxed at 30 %. As the probability of bequest prior to retirement decreases with age, the ratio falls.
1 9 The same Sharpe ratio, the N DC asset is approximately equal to a 10% investment into the risky and the remainder into the risk-free asset. states for the remainder of life. Equation (17) 
In Figure C. 7 we have plotted G from making the N DC account independent or risk-free. The groups shown are men with a university degree and women with compulsory school only. These are our extreme groups with respect to earnings, depicting a similar pattern.
[Insert …g C.7 here]
In the previous section, we showed that the value that a young individual attributes to the N DC account is very small, since consumption is preferred and savings are primarily driven by precautionary motives. The risk characteristics will therefore be of little importance for a young individual when determining expected lifetime utility.
As the expected ratio of marginal utilities increases (cf. Figure C .5), the sensitivity to changes in risk characteristics increases as well. As one approaches the retirement date, the part of the implicit assets that originates from future wages decreases, making G decline. At retirement, the de…ned bene…t asset will become risk-free, resulting in a more pronounced drop in G for the high-income group. After retirement, the G continues to decrease, as the ratio of private to N DC wealth increases (cf. Figure C .6).
At the peak, the gain in consumption and bequest equivalent units from having a risk-free N DC asset is considerable and ranges from 1:6% to 1:8%. Interestingly, about two-thirds of the gains originate from the elimination of the dependency between N DC asset returns and both group permanent income shocks and risky asset returns. During working life, the N DC asset return is correlated with future wages and de…ned bene…ts, as well as with risky asset returns. When in retirement, only the latter correlation remains, but the proportional gain ( This would have been overlooked if private wealth only could be invested in a risk-free asset.
Robustness and sensitivity
It is important to note that our parameterisation is conservative with respect to the e¤ects on the valuation of the N DC account analysed in Section 4.2: including the F DC contribution of 2:5%
would increase the forced saving; the N DC return is high and the equity premium is low, making these assets approximately equal with respect to Sharpe ratios; and …nally the impatience parameter is high which alleviates the negative consequences of forced saving. In order to test to what extent our results are in ‡uenced by the parameterisation, we perform two sensitivity tests 22 . Firstly, we decrease the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion -from 5 to 2. This parameter has the property of controling both the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the risk aversion. Our results, especially in Section 4.2, are driven by the unevenly distributed consumption across ages and are therefore likely to be a¤ected by a change in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Furthermore, determines the risk aversion and hence the analysis of the risk in the NDC account in Section 4.3.
Secondly, we increase the risk premium to 4%; since our reference case with 3% is low both in comparison with the empirical average and with other studies (eg. Cocco ( [Insert …g C.8 here]
Changing the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion from 5 to 2 has a dual e¤ect on the value attributed to the N DC asset. On the one hand, the increase in elasticity of intertemporal substitution raises the value of the N DC asset when the individuals are young and liquidity constrained, since it makes agents more willing to substitute consumption over time. On the other hand, a lower induces a higher demand for risky assets and the agent will become constrained by the short sales constraint on the risk-free asset. The N DC asset is a closer substitute for the risk-free asset than for the risky with wages. Idiosyncratic risks in such schemes, eg. demographic risks, are of less relevance. This is in sharp contrast to how some of these funds interpret their risks. When describing its optimization problem, one fund stated that: "The optimization of risk-return was done relative to the minimum risk portfolio...This was considered to be the portfolio showing the smallest tracking error relative to the income index " (Wassum (2002)). 2 2 We only present the results for the group Men with a High School Degree, since this group is the most numerous and their wage pro…le is closest to the average of all groups. asset and hence an undesirable investment for an agent with relatively low risk aversion.
[Insert …g C.9 here] Early in life the two e¤ects o¤set each other, making the value attributed to the N DC account approximately equal to that in the reference case (cf. Figure C.9) . Later in life as consumption reaches the lifetime average, the e¤ect of a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution diminishes, resulting in a substantially lower value attributed to the N DC asset than in the reference case. During the last ten years of life, the importance of the non-negativity constraint on the risk-free asset decreases, making the marginal value of the N DC asset equal to the after tax value.
Changing the risk premium, depreciates the relative value of the N DC asset to cash on hand. This e¤ect is most pronounced for a young individual, who is forced to hold this asset for a longer period.
[Insert …g C.10 here]
In Figures C.10 and C .11, we demonstrate the sensitivity of our results in Section 4.3, with respect to the same changes in risk premium and risk aversion. Lowering the individual risk aversion will reduce the gains from making the N DC asset return independent ( Figure C.11) or risk-free ( Figure   C .10). A higher risk premium relative to the reference case will increase the gains, because the individual will now have a larger proportion of cash on hand in the risky asset. However, the proportion of gains ( 2 3 ) that stems from independency relative to zero risk will be approximately intact.
[Insert …g C.11 here]
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
This paper contributes to the understanding of the risk characteristics and welfare e¤ects of N DC pension systems. We present a life-cycle model of a borrowing constrained individual's consumption and portfolio choice in the presence of uncertain labour income and realistically calibrated tax and pension systems. The pension scheme consists of both a de…ned bene…t and a notionally de…ned contribution part, the latter being indexed to stochastic aggregate labour income growth.
We investigate the utility e¤ects from forced retirement savings in an asset with returns determined by labour income growth. Firstly, our …ndings show that individuals attribute little value to their pension savings in early life. We expect this result to hold qualitatively for any pension scheme with a ‡at contribution rate across ages therefore to be independent of the country speci…c calibration.
Welfare gains can consequently be achieved by postponing the contribution from early to mid working life, while keeping the duration of the N DC account unchanged. Such a change could also lead to an increase in supply and demand for young labour and thereby encourage an earlier entry into the labour market.
Secondly, we …nd that it is the dependency between labour income growth and N DC returns rather than the volatility in N DC returns that is the most important source of welfare loss. The reason is that it makes the returns of the N DC asset correlate with individual future wages and de…ned bene…ts, as well as with risky asset returns. This e¤ect is essential when analysing the consequences of the proposed change (cf. CSSS (2001)) in the US Social Security Bene…t indexation that will make retention rates negatively correlated with aggregate wages (cf. Munnell and Soto (2005) ). The positive welfare e¤ects of this negative correlation will therefore partly compensate for the lower expected retention rate.
Another implication is that to the extent that N DC schemes are supported by bu¤er funds (as in Sweden) to even out di¤erences between contributions and bene…ts, such funds should actively manage their assets with the aim to minimise the correlation with wages. Idiosyncratic risks in such schemes, eg. demographic risks, are of less relevance. Societal gains could therefore be achieved by reducing dependency between the N DC asset and aggregate income. This topic has been discussed earlier in eg. Shiller (2003) .
The introduction of a risky asset into a model with these risk characteristics demonstrates the limited inter-generational risk sharing that can be achieved through an N DC asset dependent on average wage growth.
APPENDIX A: OPTIMIZATION
Since no analytical solution to the Equation (17) exists, we solved it numerically by backward recursion. The continuous state variables (cash on hand X, retirement savings account N DC and permanent component of shocks to labour income ) and choice variables (consumption weight and risky weight ) were discretised. The grid of points in X and N DC was distributed exponentially, whereas a uniformly spaced grid was used for ; and : The introduction of tax and pension systems that are not proportional to wages prohibits us from normalising the problem, i.e. we cannot reduce the dimension of the state space, as was done in eg. CCGM and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) .
Due to zero survival probability in the …nal year, the value function is simpli…ed since cash on hand is partly consumed and the remainder is bequeathed. Policies and the value of the Bellman equation were therefore easily determined for each combination of state variables. We approximated the value and policy functions for intermediate points with a third degree polynomial B-spline, eg.
de Boor (1978) . The value function in the terminal period was then used to compute the value function in the previous period, where the expectation in Equation (17) was evaluated using a Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation (eg. Golub and Welsch (1969) ). Close to any of the kinks in payout or tax functions, we re…ned the approximation by using a higher number of nodes. For every combination of states, the optimum was found by a grid search in each choice dimension and . This procedure was then iterated backwardly until the initial year.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION
We estimated the parameters in the labour income process by using LINDA data for the years 1992 to 2002. LINDA -a register-based longitudinal data set -consists of a large panel of individuals, which is representative for the population from 1960 and onwards. The data set covers 3.35% of the Swedish population (more then 300,000 individuals plus their household members) and is described in Edin and Fredriksson (2000) .
The income data is based on …led tax reports. Our de…nition of income includes, in addition to wages, all taxable social bene…ts, primarily compensation for unemployment, sickness and early retirement. We assumed that all individuals with an income less than 100 were voluntarily unemployed, and they were therefore excluded from the estimation. The data was divided into six non-intersecting groups, de…ned by educational status and sex. The three educational groups were individuals without a gymnasium (high school) degree, individuals with a gymnasium degree but no university degree, and …nally individuals with a university degree. Individuals with missing values for educational status (approximately 1.2 percent of the sample) were deleted.
The predictable component of labour income was estimated separately for each group using a balanced panel random e¤ects model with an AR (1) disturbance term, l ikt = k0 + Z ikt k +# ki + e ikt ; i = 1; :::N k e ikt = e ikt 1 + { ikt ; t = 1; :::; T;
where
and where l ikt is the logarithm of income adjusted for overall income growth in the economy. Z ikt includes dummy variables for marital status and age as well as number of children in four separate age intervals. The estimated coe¢ cients are presented in Table C :3: After adjusting the age dummies for expected future labour productivity growth, we estimated a polynomial of degree three on the age dummies and the averages of the characteristics to obtain the forward-looking deterministic income ; of shocks to labour income as speci…ed in Equation (2), were estimated using the methodology of Carroll and Samwick (1997) .
De…ne individual residuals from Equation (22), as
The two parameters in Equation (25) were estimated using OLS on the di¤erences -d and a constant term. We allow for a serial correlation in the transitory term of order M A(2) by only including di¤erences d > 2: Furthermore, we exclude the maximum di¤erence d = 10 since there is only one observation. This gives us 35 observations for each individual. The results are presented in Table C .5, along with the results by Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Cocco et al. (2005) .
We then follow the procedure of Cocco et al. (2005) to estimate the correlation between labour income shocks and stock returns. Using Equation (2), the …rst di¤erence in l ikt can be written as
Taking the average over individuals in each group gives us the group aggregate component:
Finally, we estimate the correlations % k by running the following OLS regression:
In Table C .1 we present the result from Equation (28), using the return of the Swedish equity index OMX as a proxy for equity returns and the 12-month Swedish Treasury Bill as the risk-free rate. Carroll and Samwick (1997) and CGM to Cocco et al. (2005) . Gain in consumption and bequest equivalent units CBE for the remainder of the life, due to making the NDC account independent or risk free for men with a university degree and women with compulsary school only.
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Contingent Survival Probabilities
FIG. C.8
Simulated pro…les for men with a high school degree. E¤ects from changing the risk premium and relative risk aversion.
FIG. C.9
E¤ects on the marginal value of the NDC from changing the risk premium and risk aversion for men with a high school degree.
FIG. C.10
Gain in consumption and bequest equivalent units CBE for the remainder of the life, due to making the N DC account risk free for men with a high school degree.
FIG. C.11
Gain in consumption and bequest equivalent units CBE for the remainder of the life, due to making the N DC account independent for men with a high school degree.
FIG. C.12
Proportion of savings allocated to the risky asset at the age of 64 with N DC held constant for men with a high school degree.
FIG. C.13
Proportion of cash on hand consumed at the age of 64 with N DC held constant for men with a high school degree.
FIG. C.14 Simulated frequency distributions for the choice variables across ages for men with a high school degree. The upper picture is the proportion of savings allocated to the risky asset : The lower picture is the proportion of cash on hand consumed :
